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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT PRESERVED HIS ISSUES _FOR APPEAL 
Appellee claims that Appellant has failed to preserve his issues on appeal pursuant 
to Utah R. App. P. 24(a), stating that Utah appellate courts "will not address an issue if it 
is not preserved or if the appellant has not established other ground for seeking review." 
However, the rule states that the appellant must provide in a "citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court per Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A) or 
state grounds for seeking review of ari issue not preserved in the trial court pursuant to 
u'b Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B). In addition, Rule 24(a)(9) provides that a brief"argument 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Id. 
A. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present the issue in the trial 
court. The issue must be "specifically ra1sed, in a timely manner, and must be supported 
by evidence and relevant legal authority." State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ,I 29 (Utah 2015). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that to properly preserve an issue for appellate 
review, the issue must be raised in the district court. O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, 217 
P.3d 704 (Utah 2009). The purpose of the preservation requirement is to put the district 
court on notice of an issue and provide it with an opportunity to rule on it. Donjuan v. 
McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ,I 20 (Utah 2011). 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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While Appellee claims that Appellant's issues were not adequately briefed, the 
record and the Appellant's Opening Brief both evidence that this is not the.c~e. 
Appellant submitted to this Court a 40-page appellate brief that contains more than 60 
citations to decisions and rules in support of his arguments. In addition, Appellant's brief 
cites to the district court's findings of fact and court transcripts which support his 
challenges to the findings of the lower court. Appellant has marshalled the record for 
evidence that supports his arguments. The Utah Supreme Court held that in order to 
satisfy rule 24(a)(9), "the argument must provide meaningful legal analysis." Wilson v. 
IHC Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43, ,I 121,289 P.3d 369 (Utah 2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Similarly, "The focus should be on the merits, not on some arguable deficiency in 
the appellant's duty of marshaling". State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I42 326 P.3d 645, 
(Utah 2014). "Too often, the appellee's brief is focused on this latter point, and not 
enough on the ultimate merits of the case. To encourage the l_att~r and discourage the 
former, we also hereby repudiate the requirements of playing 'devil's advocate' and of 
·v:J presenting 'every scrap of competent evidence' in a 'comprehensive and fastidious 
order.' That formulation is nowhere required in the rule. And its principal impact on 
briefing has been to incentivize appellees to conduct a fastidious review of the record in 
the hope of identifying a scrap of evidence the appellant may have overlooked. That is 
not the point of the marshaling rule, and will no longer be an element of our 
consideration of it." State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I43, 326 P3d 645, (Utah 2014) 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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·..:J 
(citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,I77, 100 P.3d 1177). Appellant's arguments and 
the trial court record are substantial outlining the mistake, inconsistency, error and 
confusion of the trial Court's distribution. Appellant has made strong persuasive 
arguments for his claims, and Appellee's claim is without merit. 
B. THE PLAIN ERROR EXCEPTION 
Assuming arguendo, an issue is raised on appeal that was not preserved below, the 
appellate court will review it for plain error. "Under plain error review, we may reverse 
the lower court on an issue not properly preserved" only if the party shows that "(i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the party." "An error is obvious only if the law governing the error was clear 
at the time the alleged error was made." T.D.G. v. L.R. On re A.T.I.G.}, 2012 UT 88, ,I 22 
(Utah 2012). The Supreme Court has also stated that "[f]or an issue to be sufficiently 
raised, it must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can 
consider it." Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2010 UT 4, ,I 14,247 P.3d 357 (Utah 2010); 
R.C.S. v. A.O.L. On re Baby Girl T.), 2012 UT 78, ,I 34 (Utah 2012); Donjuan v. 
McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ,I 21 (Utah 2011). The Court of Appeals will find that 
Appellant has made such a case, in the event that it found the issues not preserved for 
appeal. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. THE APPELLATE COURT BAS WIDE DISCRETION TO BEAR ISSUES ON 
APPEAL 
Appellee' s counsel provides an exhaustive dissertation on the requirements for 
preserving an issue for appeal. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5) states that a timely and specific 
objection supported by evidence or legal authority must be made in the trial court. Id. 
While Appellant has clearly preserved the issues presented for appeal, again, assuming 
arguendo, an issue is raised on appeal that was not preserved below, this Court has held 
that it may exercise wide discretion when deciding whether to entertain or reject matters 
that are first raised on appeal. Town & Country Bank v. Stevens, 2014 UT App 172 
(Utah Ct. App. 2014). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the two primary 
considerations underlying the preservation rule are judicial economy and fairness. Kell v. 
-v/1 State, 2012 UT 25, if 11, 285 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2012) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted); Fort Pierce Indus. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass'n v. Shakespeare, 2016 
UT 28, if 13 (Utah 2016). In Kell, the Supreme Court held that the district court "not only 
had an opportunity to rule on the issue [ that the State argued was not preserved] but in 
fact "did rule on it." Id., at 1136. In that case, the court noted that "[t]he district court's 
decision to take up the question ... conclusively overcame any objection that the issue 
was not preserved for appeal." Id. See Fort Pierce Indus. Park, supra. Further, this court 
has held that the preservation requirement is "self-imposed and is therefore one of 
prudence rather than jurisdiction." Town & Country Bank v. Stevens, supra; Patterson v. 
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, iJ 18, 266 P.3d 828 (Utah 2011); Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, 
iJ 15 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). See also Brooks v. A.S., 2015 UT 35, iJ 9-10 (Utah 2015) 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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("[T]he legal questions presented are important, and counsel adequately preserved them 
below. . . [ raising] statutory ... questions in the district court, and we therefore deem them 
preserved for purposes of appeal."). The Court should find that judicial economy and 
fairness dictate that Appellant's arguments be heard on appeal in the event that they are 
found to be not properly preserved. Rule 24(a)(9) does require "development of that 
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority," Lundgren v. Lundgren, 2015 
UT 58, if 13 (Utah 2015) (citing State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)), 
Appellant's arguments on appeal satisfy this standard. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN TH~ PROPERTY 
DETERMINATIONS AND IN APPLYING THE SEPARATION 
AGREEMENT. 
The intent of the property division pursuant to the Separation Agreement was clear 
and the distribution equitable; as a result, the property division agreed to by the parties 
should not have been disturbed by the district court. The Separation Agreement executed 
by the parties was clear in its intent and division of assets. The assets the parties had to 
deal with consisted of cash, individual pensions and the 10 lots in Hawaii. Specifically, it 
' . . . 
-..{J) was understood and agreed that Appellant would mainta~n his pre-marital property, 
accumulated and appreciated from the Dover property, half acquired prior to the parties' 
marriage and with funds kept separate and apart from marital assets. The parties would 
split equally the remaining cash assets approximately $800,000. In addition, Appellant 
would keep the 10 lots in Hawaii titled in his name with consideration that he would 
assume complete responsibility of their son's college education, which evidence 
indicated was in excess of $200,000. (Appellant's Brief, p. 8 and Transcript April 30, 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
page 163-164). The distribution made by the district court was not consistent with the 
Separation Agreement and was inequitable. The district court determined that the 
Separation Agreement was valid and therefore should have enforced it in its entirety as 
agreed to by the parties and under which they lived. Appellant clearly demonstrated the 
manner in which the trial court's classification and distribution of marital or separate 
property was an abuse of discretion. Appellant detailed the parties' discussions in 
preparing the separation agreement, their knowledge of the assets, their financial 
accounts, understanding of separate property, how the separate property was calculated, 
..tJ) the issues concerning their funding, enhancement, repairs, and maintenance. (Appellant 
Brief, p. 14-15). As such, Appellee's contentions fail. 
~ Although the trial court in a divorce action is allowed considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 
468,470 (Utah 1984), Appellant has shown that (1) there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejll:dicial error; (2) the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3) such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
~ manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782-83 (Utah 
1986). While this is a heavy burden, the district court abuses its discretion where "no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." Goggin I, 2011 UT 7 6, 
'\Ji!) 
,r 26,267 P.3d 885 (Utah 2011). Appellant provided substantial evidence that he owned 
premarital assets which he maintained as separate property and that certain assets were 
owned separately throughout the marriage. (Transcript April 29, page 196, L 10-12 and 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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page 198, L 21-25, and Transcript April 30, page 163, L 3-9) {Transcript April 29, page 
196, L 23-25). See Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9 and 18-19. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT DISCRETION BY INCORRECTLY 
AWARDING ALIMONY. 
The trial court's order concerning alimony was incorrect and inconsistent with the 
purpose and intent of the Separation Agreement resulting in an inequitable distribution of 
lJ) assets. {Transcript April 30, Page 51 lines 18-23), {Transcript April 30, Page 52 lines 14-
18) (G. Sandusky Depo 94, L 10-18), also included Exhibit 6 filed as pleading tiled 
Exhibits 6-10 on May 5, 2014). The trial court erred in concluding that the facts and 
circumstances warranted an award of alimony. The separation agreement allowed for 
Appellants separate property and an equal division of the remaining assets. (Findings of 
Fact No. 39). The monthly support and maintenance payments were determined as 6% 
interest on the Appellee's portion of the division of the remaining assets, or $400,000. 
The lump sum amount was represented in addendum to the agreement wherein either 
party may terminate the monthly payments with a lump sum payment. (See Appellant's 
Brief, p. 21-22). When the parties' entered into the separation agreement they were 
dealing with fixed assets. (Findings of Fact dated No. 43) which distribution was 
understood and agreed upon. (Appellant's Brief, p. 29-30). At the time of trial, the assets 
vu effectively remained the same. (Findings of Fact No. 44). Instead the Court redistributed 
the assets contrary to the parties' agreement and awarded alimony. The correct 
interpretation of the lump sum award is Appellee's property distribution. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Bair v. Bair, 737 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1987), reversed the trial court's 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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finding of alimony based on similar language in an agreement between the parties and 
held "The only support for the trial court's 'alimony' finding is that the sum was 
designated as an 'allowance for support.' Yet the further provisions of the stipulation and 
vJ agreement and the parties' intent as established by their affidavits overwhelmingly 
support our conclusion that the finding was erroneous and that the sum constituted a 
property settlement. The stipulation and agreement of the parties recited as its purpose the 
'settlement of all rights and obligations ... including property rights."' Likewise, this is 
the only equitable interpretation of the parties' separation agreement. 
Further, the lump sum property distribution negates a need for alimony by 
Appellee. And distribution of all the cash assets of the parties negates Appellant's ability 
~ to pay. The trial court erroneously concluded that "although Respondent is unemployed, 
he is able to earn income from his real estate and hard money loan ventures." (Findings 
of Fact No. 34). The evidence was clear that these ventures were conducted with the 
cash proceeds now being distributed to the parties and such ventures had not occurred 
since the parties' separation. The court also conversely found, Appellant's "monthly 
~ deficit is approximately $750.00. (Findings of Fact No. 34). The trial court's 
interpretation of the agreement on the issue of alimony is reversible error. 
IV. APPELLEE'S ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE REGARDING 
ACCOUNTING SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED INTO THE APPELLATE 
RECORD OR ARGUED, AS IT ADDRESSES AN ISSUE THAT WAS NOT 
APPEALED. 
Appellee raises for the first time in her opposition brief that Appellant failed to 
produce evidence of tracings or accounting of funds between the time of the Separation 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Agreement and the trial. Appellee did not cross-appeal on this issue. As a result, she is 
prohibited from raising it in her opposition brief. Utah R. App. P. Rule 24( c) ("if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
vP appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal."). The Court should not consider 
this issue raised only in her opposition brief, as Appellee has waived her right to address 
this in a cross-appeal. See Utah R. App. P. Rules 4( d) and 52(b ). 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE AFFIRMED 
BASED ON THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE. 
Appellee claims that the district court judgment should be affirmed in light of the 
invited error doctrine. However, the doctrine is invoked when there are affirmative 
representations "where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that 
there is no objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous 
authority upon which the court relies." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, if 23, 164 P.3d 366 
(Utah 2007); State v. Cooper, 2011 UT App 234, iJ 10 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Newman v. 
White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, if 16 (Utah 2008). The record gives no evidence of 
Appellant's counsel encouraging the trial court to make any erroneous ruling or 
intentionally misleading the district court in order to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal ... " State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ,r 17, 365 P.3d 699 (Utah 2016) 
vo (internal quotation marks omitted)). See Fort Pierce Indus. Park Phases II, III & IV 
Owners Ass'n v. Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28, ,r 14 (Utah 2016). 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS EQUITABLE 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY AND AW ARD OF ALIMONY. 
Contrary to Appellee's persistent argument, Appellant has consistently throughout 
his Appellate Brief marshalled and supported his claims with factual citations from the 
record and evidenced an abuse of discretion or an incorrect application of law to fact by 
the district court. 
The district court ruled the Separation Agreement and Addendum valid (Findings of 
Fact Nos. 19-21) but contradictorily interpreted the Agreement inequitably against its 
purpose. The district court found that Appellant's testimony as to the intent and basis for 
the property distribution in the Separation Agreement was in direct conflict with the 
language of the agreement, specifically Article 4. (Findings of Fact No. 39). Yet the 
viJ agreement addendum specifically terminates monthly alimony payments with a lump sum 
cash payment of $400,000. This language is consistent with Appellant's testimony and 
not in direct conflict. 
The table below clearly outlines error in the trial court's identifi~ation and 
distribution of assets. 
(INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK TO INSERT TABLE ON NEXT PAGE) 
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Assets Per Decree of Divorce Jud ment 
BANKACCOUNTS 1• · · ' '_.- . . 
Hawaii Credit Union Acct $166,694.00 
LAFCU Acct (endin in 400) $345,020.00 
LAFCU Acct (endin in 401 $860.50 
Chase Acct $2,400.22 
MACU $250.00 · · · 
EAS Trust Acct $310,000.00 
$40;000.00 
TOT AL $865,224.72 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVEABLE2 
Loan to Mike Anderson $40,000.00 
Loan to Sister and Niece $265,000.00 
Mednick deficiency Jud 1ent TBD . 
REAL PROPERTY3 
Foo house and lot $428,500.00 
TOT AL $428,500.00 
TOTAL VALUE OF ASSETS $1,293,724.72 
Distribution Ordered b the Court4 
PETITlONER 
Amount in attome trust account5 
Bond Amount based on Final Order (held in Court 
trust 6 
50% of Foo house artd Iot7 
RESPONDENT . 
10 lots awarded as separate property ( cash in bank 
accts 7 · · · · 
50% of Foo house and lot7 
1 Findings ofFact, p. 36 . 
$310,000.00 
$487,106.14 
$214,250.00 
TOTAL $1,011;356.14 
$335 ,000.00 
$214,250.00 
TOTAL $549,250.00 
2 Evidence shows repaid; Appellant's Brief, p. 9, Transcript April 30, p. 51 , L 18-23, p. 52, L 14-18 
3 Findings ofFact, p. 37 
4 These amounts do not include personal property or the parties' separate pension/40 l (K) that the Court determined 
to be a fair and equitable distribution per the Separation Agreement 
5 November 2, 20 15 Order 
6 January 5, 2016 Order 
7 July 23 , 2015 Divorce Decree 
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VII. THE JUDGEMNT SHOULD NOT BE AFFIRMED BASED ON THE 
ARGUMENT THAT APPELALNT FAILED TO INVOKE THE 
AUTHORITY OF 59(a)(a)(l) IN HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellee's counsel raises the issue of Appellant basis for his motion for a new 
trial. Appellee's counsel claims that Appellant cited Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(a)(l); that_ the 
motion was limited to 59(a)(5)(6)(7) and Rule 60(b)(l) and (6); and that the motion or 
arguments at trial did not invoke the authority of 59(a)(a)(l). For this reason, he claims 
that the order should be affirmed because Appellant's appeal was not directed at what the 
trial court ruled upon. However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that filing a post-
\@ judgment motion is not a necessary prerequisite to filing an appeal. Sittner v. Schriever, 
2000 UT 45, ,I 16, 2 P.3d 442 (Utah 2000). As a result, citing to one subsection of the 
rule or another does not prohibit the appeal or give the Court reason to affirm the district 
court decision. 
Further, Appellee's counsel states that Appellant erred by claiming the standard of 
review is correctness for legal error and that the correct standard of review is an abuse of 
discretion. However, if the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion of law, it is reviewed 
~ for correctness. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Horrell v. 
State Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
ATTORNEYS FEES TO APPELLANT. 
Appellee argues that Appellant may not be awarded attorney's fees because of his 
failure to file a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 102, and further that he did not object or 
preserve an objection to the court's not awarding him attorney fees. However,§ 30-3-
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3( 1) of the Utah Code authorizes courts to award attorney fees and costs in divorce cases 
if doing so would "enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action." Dahl v. 
Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,r 168 (Utah 2015). The award of attorney's fees must be based on 
"evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and 
the reasonableness of the requested fees." Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, ,r 27,213 
P .3d 884 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of 
whether to award attorney fees pursuant to§ 30-3-3 rests in the sound discretion of the 
district court. As such, this Court must review the district court's award or denial of fees 
vP for abuse of discretion. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ,i 19,217 P.3d 733 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2009). See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ,I 30, 147 P.3d 464 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006) {In divorce cases, "[b]oth the decision to award attorney fees and the amount 
of such fees are within the trial court's sound discretion.") ( citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ,r 27 (Utah Ct. App. 2014); Liston 
v. Liston, 2011 UT App 433, iI 26 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (when a trial court awards fees 
under its inherent power to sanction, evidentiary requirements are not implicated.) 
VJ IX. APPELLEE SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED FEES ON APPEAL. 
vj} 
Appellee's counsel has determined that Appellant's appellate brief is frivolous for 
failing to preserve issues, failing to marshal the evidence, and "he invited error in the 
trial court ... " (Appellee's Brief, p. 55.) In addition, opposing counsel explains that the 
fact Appellant brought three "separate post-trial motions, all which were in large part 
denied" as evidence of a frivolous appeal. (!g.) 
v, 13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a frivolous appeal is "one that is 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). The Utah 
Supreme Court states that this is a "high bar," Redd v. Hill, 2013 UT 35, ,r 28, 304 P.3d 
861 (Utah 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the Court will sanction attorneys 
for frivolous appeals only in the most "egregious cases" where an obviously meritless 
appeal "result[ s] in the delay of a proper judgment." Redd v. Hill, supra; Pang v. Int'l 
Document Servs., 2015 UT 63, ,r 13 (Utah 2015). See, e.g., Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 
\,ti) 299, 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Sanctions are appropriate for appeals obviously without 
merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper 
judgment.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Appellant's petition does not present such a case. Sanctions under Rule 
33 are inappropriate. Redd v. Hill, supra. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to 
award attorney fees to Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests that this Court reverse the decision of 
the trial court and direct that court to modify its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to correct its errors in the interpretation of the Separation Agreement, its miscalculations 
of the assets, and inequitable distribution in order for the Appellant to have a fair 
resolution of this matter. 
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DATED this 5th day of Octoher.20 16. 
\ 
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